Katherine Isabella Olsen

What makes up a monster: definitions in Leviathan

Thomas Hobbes is fastidious in his use of definitions throughout his formative piece Leviathan, (1651) and makes sure to define each term he speaks of to such a degree it can not be either misconstrued or feel ambiguous. Each term is then carefully located within and connected
to a network of other terms that are shaped into the philosophies and arguments of Hobbes, which rely on concrete syllogisms to unfurl his ideas to his readers. He supports his argument that a commonwealth will spring up by defining the nature of man and the natural conditions of
man, then arguing that because of the traits present throughout the only way for survival (desirous by the definition and necessary by mans observed current survival) would be the creation of a commonwealth, which he then defines in terms that make a sovereign leader bound
by a social contract desirable and obvious.

Before Hobbes can even start to argue for his Leviathan, he insists upon definitions as the way for truths to be established, in order for man to be able to make sense of anything. He states, “seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that
seeketh precise truth, had need to remember what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly;” because “men begin at settling the significations of their words; which settling of significations, they call definitions; and place them in the beginning of their reckoning.” (pp 28) In order to find the truth of any particular matter, one must decide what significations of words, or definitions, to find accurate and relevant. Truth is for Hobbes subjective and dependent on the stances of the debaters: two people with two different views or definitions of the world cannot
have rational conversation together, or at the very least any semblance of precision, and must first come together to see how their definitions vary in order to reach any similar conclusion. Hobbes supports this idea of truth or correctness by explaining that this method of discussion has
been used throughout history, in the field of Geometry.

Geometry, or “the onely science that it hath pleased God to hitherto to bestow upon mankind,” (pp 28) consistently relies upon the use of definitions to derive all other information from. Definitions are established, and then the only possible relationships are stated within or
derived from those initial definitions. The whole field is based entirely upon a few definitions, with all studies being devoted to searching for new ways to understand how those definitions are related. Such discourses always follow the same structure: connections of words to general
affirmations, then to syllogisms that lead to the conclusion. When based on definitions, that “conditionall knowledge” based on the meaning of those words is science. Contrasted with discourses based not on definitions, or on general or incorrect ones, “the end or conclusion, is
again opinion, namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senselesse words, without possibility of being understood.” (pp 50) Senseless or absurd conclusions are comprised of absurd words that he defines as merely sounds without meaning, and he gives an
example later of a round quadragon: whose words individually are comprehensible but when combined are obviously the result of some error in mental processes, and that only incorrect or
very vague definitions of the two could result in. Hobbes also says that opinions can make sense, as in the case of generalizations or incomplete definitions resulting in conceivable conclusions, and his definition renders many other philosophies and schools all opinion based, rather than in
science. By omitting to define clearly the principles of thought the rest of the philosophy is based on, these philosophies err towards the general or improvable, as opposed to Hobbes’, which is firmly supported by all the definitions he spends the first half of Leviathan writing out. Hobbes
goes on, creating more definitions that increasingly support him as a scientist, rather than an opinionist.

Beyond words, Hobbes defines the subcategories of names in order to argue for the importance of precision in this aspect of speech and thought as well. He says that the correct definition of names leads to the acquisition of science, but in omitting definitions “lyes the first
abuse; from which proceed all false and senslesse tenets;” leading those that commit such errors to “take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, [and] to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true science are above it.”
(pp 28) Hobbes again stresses the importance of definitions in the pursuit of what he calls science, or the further understanding of the world around one. In arguing that those false tenets lead to individuals complacent in second-hand reasonings and that the individual who chooses
such complacency is worse off than an ignorant man who does not have the option of any reasoning supports Hobbes’ argument additionally as he states that men desire the good opinion of others and in order to gain such an opinion, the pursuit of science is a good option as long as
one relies on definitions as Hobbes has stated. The more precise their speech the more true their conclusions and the more intelligent they are thought to be, and the desirability of such a thing is argued in another of Hobbe’s arguments. Not wholly selfish does Hobbes make man out to be,
though, and that their desires can be altruistic for all of mankind’s advancement is a further point.

Not only does Hobbes argue that definitions are the only acceptable basis for any argument, but he dutifully relies upon definitions for all of his further arguments. Hobbes sums up the distinction between man and animal, stating that “the light of humane minds is perspicuous words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; reason is
the pace; encrease of science, the way; and the benefit of man-kind, the end.” (pp 37) This conclusion supports Hobbes’ formerly discussed arguments that state man wants to pursue science (individually bound by their own capacity for reason), and allows for a gentler goal for these men than mere personal enrichment; rather the enrichment of their whole society. However, this conclusion is just another place Hobbes rests before moving towards his goal of defining the Leviathan, and this conclusion is itself made up of many smaller definitions Hobbes had to work out earlier.

To support his argument of the Leviathan, Hobbes first defines the nature of man, and then man’s natural conditions. Hobbes delves inward, defining sense and imagination, their consequences, reason and science, and the ends of discourse. He defines the natural conditions of man using those same definitions to contrast man and (the more simply successful within nature) animal further, explaining how in those conditions it is every man for himself and life is “nasty, brutish, and short” (pp 97). From that more complete view, he argues that a commonwealth must arise, bound by a social contract, and that a sovereign with almost unlimited power is the best ruler for that commonwealth. These definitions are his argument, merely phrased in such a way as to seem self-evident and hard to oppose.

Hobbes describes how in their natural state, men are competitive and violent because of the strengths nature endows upon them. He writes,